INTRODUCTION
A dictionary definition of interdict, in the military sense, is to destroy, cut or damage by ground or aerial firepower (enemy lines of reinforcement, supply, or communication) in order to stop or hamper enemy movement and to destroy or limit enemy effectiveness [1] .
This definition is unnecessarily restrictivefor instance, it should also include ship-based firepower-but the essence is reasonable: interdiction connotes preemptive attacks that limit an enemy's subsequent ability to wage war, or carry out other nefarious activities. The mathematical study of interdiction has focused primarily on network interdiction, in which an enemy's activities are modeled using the constructs of network optimization (e.g., maximum flows, multicommodity flows, and shortest paths), and in which attacks target the network's components to disrupt the network's functionality. Depending on the type of network, targeted components can include bridges, road segments or interchanges, communications links or switches, and so on. This article focuses on the bilevel network interdiction problem (BNI), but the reader should note that much of the presentation extends to interdiction of more general systems.
Examples of what we now call network interdiction date from antiquity. Greek city of Plataea; Livy [3, 22.8] reports that (in 218 BC) the Roman Senate ordered bridges near Rome to be destroyed to slow the advance of Hannibal and his troops; Polybius [4, 9.7] gives a different chronology for the latter incident, but the interpretation as ''network interdiction'' remains. Two millennia later, the American Civil War is replete with examples of both Confederate and Union forces attacking roads, bridges, rail lines, and telegraph lines to hamper the enemy's resupply, movement, and communications [5, Chapter 4] . In World War II, German submarines interdicted, that is, sank, hundreds of Allied petroleum tankers that were traveling the sea lanes of the Atlantic Ocean and elsewhere [6, Appendix 17] .
Allied bombing attacks during World War II on German-controlled oil refineries and synthetic-fuel plants exemplify a more general type of system interdiction or ''economic warfare.'' The German military was crippled by the lack of fuel and lubricants caused by the ''Oil Plan,'' as the attack strategy was called. Interestingly, an acrimonious debate was waged between the proponents of the Oil Plan (system interdiction) and proponents of the ''Rail Plan'' (network interdiction). The Rail Plan sought to destroy rail lines and other transportation assets in Europe to restrict the movement of the German troops and equipment that would counter the Allied D-Day offensive. Ultimately, parts of both plans were implemented [7, pp. 75-78, 174-175] .
Network interdiction is an important part of modern warfare where attacks on key civilian and military infrastructure can help reduce an enemy's fighting effectiveness, while incurring only limited casualties to ''friendly forces'' [8, 9] . When planning for such attacks, the ''interdictor'' is typically faced with this question: Given limited attack resources and possibly other restrictions (e.g., political considerations), which network components should be attacked to reduce the enemy's war-fighting capabilities most effectively? BNI addresses this question.
To provide background on the modern, mathematical study of network interdiction, we first make the following definitions and assumptions [10] :
1. The interdictor, called attacker hereafter, acts first by using limited interdiction resources to attack components of his enemy's network. 2. The enemy, or defender, observes the damage caused by the attack(s) and then operates the damaged network so as to maximize his own, well-defined objective-function value. 3. The attacker understands the defender's capabilities and goals, and chooses attacks that minimize the defender's maximum achievable objective-function value.
These standard assumptions lead to the formulation of BNI and more general systeminterdiction models as a type of Stackelberg game: a two-person, zero-sum, sequentialplay game with two stages [11, 12] . Wollmer [13] studies the problem of finding the single ''most vital link'' in a capacitated flow network, in his case, the arc whose deletion minimizes the maximum s-t flow in the network. (The reader who is unfamiliar with the terminology of network flows, e.g., ''s-t flows,'' may wish to consult a standard text such as Ahuja et al. [14] .) Here, the attacker has enough interdiction resource to attack and destroy exactly one arc, and the defender's objective is to maximize s-t flow. Wollmer's work may represent the earliest mathematical investigation of an instance of BNI, although as early as 1955 researchers were investigating a simpler ''single-level'' network interdiction problem that seeks to eliminate all s-t flow efficiently [15] .
Danskin [16] presents some of the fundamental theory of ''max-min models,'' which may be viewed as a generalization of BNI to system interdiction. (His ''min'' and ''max'' are reversed compared to our convention). Confusingly, ''max-min'' and similar terms are also used in the context of the more common two-person, zero-sum, simultaneous-play games [17, pp. 143-165] . For example, von Neumann [18] proves the famous ''minimax theorem'' for such games.
Mathematical studies of BNI began in earnest during the Vietnam War, with models applied to disrupt the flow of enemy troops and materiel [19, 20] . Fulkerson and Harding [21] and Golden [22] investigate the problem of maximizing the length of the shortest path in a network-to slow enemy reinforcements, say-using models in which the length of each network arc can be increased linearly, within limits, based on the amount of interdiction resource applied to it. (This is a ''max-min'' variant of BNI.) These models are solved as parametric linear programs (LPs). The k-most-vital-arcs problem [23, 24] is similar, but at most k arcs may be interdicted and interdiction decisions are discrete. In particular, an arc is attacked and destroyed and its length becomes infinite, or it is left untouched and keeps its nominal length. Ball et al. [25] show that problem to be NP-complete. Israeli and Wood [26] extend the k-most-vital-arcs problem to general resource constraints: their study of the the shortest-path network interdiction problem (or ''maximizing the shortest path''), makes important theoretical and computational contributions to the solution of BNI, in general.
Ratliff et al. [27] extend Wollmer's [13] model to the problem of finding a set of n arcs in a capacitated network whose deletion minimizes the maximum s-t flow. While investigating problems of drug interdiction, Wood [28] generalizes that model to allow general interdiction resource constraints. (Phillips [29] considers a similar model, but allows some continuous interdiction effort; see also Steinrauf [30] .) Wood shows that this maximum-flow interdiction problem is NPcomplete, even when attacks are constrained only in cardinality. Thus, even the simpler model of Ratliff et al. appears to be difficult.
More general system-interdiction issues arise in the work of Grötschel et al. [31] and Medhi [32] who seek to evaluate the vulnerability of information networks to interdiction. Chern and Lin [33] study the interdiction of a system represented as a minimum-cost network-flow model.
Similar to the BNI studied by Wood [28] , the network interdiction model of Washburn and Wood [34] aims at disrupting drug smuggling, and its efficient solution involves maximum flows. But this is a two-person, zero-sum, simultaneous-play (Cournot) game, and its purpose is quite different from BNI. Specifically, an interdictor controls one or more ''inspectors'' who must be placed strategically on the arcs of a transportation network to maximize the probability of detecting a drug smuggler moving surreptitiously through that network.
(If the smuggler traverses arc k when an inspector is present, the smuggler is detected with known probability p k ; otherwise he goes undetected.) In a simultaneous-play model, neither player can observe the other's actions before acting himself and, consequently, solutions define probabilistic (''mixed'') strategies for both players. In this case, the interdictor's strategy defines a probability distribution over the inspectors' locations, and the smuggler's strategy defines a probability distribution over paths through the network. In contrast, a solution to BNI prescribes deterministic (''pure'') strategies for both players.
Deterministic strategies do not imply that BNI cannot incorporate uncertainty and probability, however. Cormican et al. [35] develop stochastic-programming versions of the maximum-flow interdiction model to handle uncertain interdiction successes and uncertain arc capacities. Whiteman [36] , studying interdiction problems faced by the US Strategic Command, addresses uncertainty through Monte Carlo simulations of maximum-flow interdiction models. Pan et al. [37] maximize the expected probability of detecting a smuggler trying to transport stolen nuclear materials out of a country: nominal probabilities of detection can be improved by installing a limited number of radiation detectors at border crossings. Maximizing probability of detection is related, through a logarithmic transformation in the objective function, to shortest-path interdiction, and in that sense the model is deterministic. The model is stochastic, however, in that a probability distribution describes the smuggler's origin in the network [38] .
Brown et al. [39, 10] develop a taxonomy for bilevel system-interdiction and system-defense models, as well as for trilevel system-defense models. The bilevel and trilevel models are two-stage and three-stage Stackelberg games, respectively. BNI is an instance of a two-stage ''attacker-defender model''; the trilevel defense models are ''defender-attacker-defender models.'' In the latter case, a defender wishes to employ his limited defensive resources as efficiently as possible to ''interdict the interdictor,'' with effectiveness being evaluated by solving a bilevel interdiction model. Bilevel system-defense models can be constructed, also: these are ''defender-attacker models''; they apply when the value of attacking a system component is a fixed or easily computed value; they can be solved using the techniques described in this article; but will not be discussed further. We note that Brown et al. [10, 40] also discuss solution techniques for all these model types and describe a number of applications to infrastructure protection. Indeed, vulnerability analysis for infrastructure is an important new application area for BNI.
Most recently, bilevel interdiction and defense models have been developed for a number of interesting applications: theater ballistic missile defense [41] , planning attacks on multicommodity flow networks [42] , planning attacks on communications networks [43] , delaying the nuclear-weapons project of a ''rogue state'' [44] , and attacking and defending electric-power grids [45] . The theory of ''global Benders decomposition'' developed in the last paper promises to be a useful computational technique for BNI (and other optimization problems), and is discussed later in this article.
The goal of the rest of this article is to describe basic theoretical models and solution techniques for BNI. A lack of space prohibits further detailed discussion of applications. More information on advanced computational techniques can be found in Magnanti and Wong [46] , Israeli and Wood [26] , Salmerón et al. [45] , and Smith et al. [47] .
A BASIC, BILEVEL, INTERDICTION MODEL
In abstract form, BNI may be stated as the following attacker-defender model:
and where (i) x ∈ X denotes a binary vector of attack decisions that is limited by resources and perhaps logical restrictions (e.g., targets k and k both cannot be attacked); (ii) y ∈ Y(x) denotes the activities that the defender will carry on after the attack, typically restricted by effects of the attack x; and (iii) the objective function f (x, y) measures the functionality of the defender's network after the attack. Thus, the attacker seeks to minimize the functionality of the network which the defender is assumed to maximize. Of course, by switching the min and the max, we can model an attacker who seeks to maximize the cost of the defender's operations.
[AD0] is a special case of a Stackelberg game in which a leader (attacker) takes some action, and a follower (defender) observes that action and its effects, and then responds optimally given that information (12) . [AD0] is a two-stage game and is finished after the follower responds; more general Stackelberg games may have many stages and/or players.
For the sake of concreteness and simplicity, further development of [AD0] assumes that 1. The defender's activities take place on network arcs, which are indexed by k, and there is a one-to-one correspondence with the attacker's potential targets. 2. The defender nominally optimizes network operation by solving the following LP which is feasible for any u ≥ 0
3. Restrictions on the attacker assume x = 0 is feasible, and are represented by X = x ∈ {0, 1} n | Hx ≤ h , and (5) 4. x k = 1 implies that activity k is attacked, its level forced to 0, that is, y k = 0.
Then, defining U = diag(u), [AD0] takes on the following specific form
The inner LP in [ADLP1] might represent a simple maximum-flow problem [27, 28] , the optimal deployment of the defenders's armed forces [48] , or the production and distribution of oil or natural gas in a belligerent country [49] .
[ADLP1] extends easily to attacks on nodes, attacks on groups of arcs and/or nodes, attacks that reduce capacity only partially, and so on, but such extensions are straightforward and not considered here.
A Stackelberg game with mixed-integer variables and having just two levels of decision making is called a bilevel mixed-integer program (BLMIP) [50] . However, the leader's and follower's objective functions in a BLMIP are not usually diametrically opposed as they are in [AD0]; for example, see Bard and Moore [51] , Wen and Yang [52] , and Hansen et al. [53] . In fact, most algorithms developed for BLMIPs assume a strong positive correlation between the leader's and follower's objective functions. Thus, the theory and algorithms for BLMIPs do not seem well-suited for handling [ADLP1], while the special-purpose methods described in this article have had demonstrated successes.
Standard LP theory tells us that z 1 (x) is a concave function in (continuous) x. Thus, [ADLP1] is a difficult, nonconvex minimization problem. The problem can be ''convexified,'' however, by moving x into the objective of the inner maximization.
Proposition 1 [54] . Let r k be an upper bound on the optimal dual variable for the
T and R = diag(r), and define 
s.t. [45] evaluate the effects of an attack plan x on a large, regional electric-power grid using a standard electric-power model. In contrast, a MIP formulation for BNI in this case becomes unwieldy (and can only be solved for small, unrealistic test problems) [56] .
BENDERS DECOMPOSITION
The 
That model has this formulation as a MIP
Benders decomposition dynamically generates constraints (19) Algorithm A-1, or simply ''A-1,'' is actually a special case of Benders decomposition that does not require ''feasibility cuts'' [59] . Such cuts are needed if the subproblems can become infeasible for certain x ∈ X, which ours cannot by assumption. The correctness of the algorithm is easy to see: (i) The upper bound z is valid because it corresponds to some feasible solution of [ADLP2] for the minimizing attacker; (ii) the lower bound z is valid because it corresponds to a relaxation of the equivalent master problem [ADMP2(Y)]; (iii) if a solutionx ever repeats, it follows that z = z and the algorithm must terminate; and (iv) the termination criterion is satisfied with z = z or a solution repeats in a finite number of steps because X is a discrete, finite set.
The following section describes some enhancements to A-1 that may improve solution speeds, and shows how global Benders decomposition can actually solve more general problems than [ADLP2].
IMPROVING AND GENERALIZING BENDERS DECOMPOSITION Faster Solutions with Super-Valid Inequalities
The (relaxed) master problem [ADMP1(Ŷ)] can be strengthened in some instances by adding super-valid inequalities (SVIs). Intuitively, this strengthening can help alleviate some of the difficulties caused by weak dual bounds r. SVIs are similar to valid inequalities of integer-programming theory [60, pp. 205-295 ] except that they may, and typically do, eliminate feasible solutions from the master problem. We define SVIs with respect to general MIPs. If case (i) is true for that SVI, then an optimal solution will still be found via enumeration because (a) some optimal solution is still feasible, and (b) any lower bound obtained from a relaxation of the SVI-modified MIP is still a valid lower bound on z * 2 . Thus, standard fathoming tests within a branch-and-bound algorithm and the convergence tests in A-1 are valid. If case (ii) is true when we add the SVI, we simply want our algorithm to halt with a message that the incumbentx * is optimal, and this is easy to arrange. After adding the SVI 1. If the MIP is found to be infeasible, or z > z(x * ), we declare the incumbent optimal, which it is, or 2. If z − z ≤ occurs, we declare the incumbent to be -optimal, which it is. (As often happens, our incumbent is optimal, but we only prove it to be -optimal.)
By induction, it follows that an enumeration algorithm incorporating a finite number of SVIs will also terminate correctly and finitely. One type of SVI for our enhanced version of A-1 applied to [ADLP2] is easy to derive.
Proposition 2 [26]. Let z +ŷ
T Rx ≥ c Tŷ denote a Benders cut from Algorithm A-1 being used to solve [ADLP2] .
Then, the following inequality is super-valid:
Suppose that R derives from strict dual bounds and thatŷ is the response to the feasible interdiction planx. It follows that y T Rx = I(ŷ) Tx = 0, and thatx is made infeasible by the SVI I(ŷ) T x ≥ 1. That is, the inequality I(ŷ) T x ≥ 1 is not valid in the standard sense. Note also thatx could be an optimal solution which is made infeasible by the inequality, but if we already have an optimal solution in hand, we have free reign to restrict the solution in any way we like.
A simple extension of Proposition 2 leads to
Corollary 1.
For every Benders cut z + y T Rx ≥ c Tŷ , the SVI of Proposition 2 can be tightened to
Tŷ − max k =k {r kŷk + r k ŷ k } > z, and so on.
Of course, as z changes during the course of A-1, it may be possible to tighten previously generated SVIs.
Modifications of A-1 to incorporate SVIs are straightforward, and SVIs may improve solution times substantially. Israeli and Wood [26] demonstrate this and show how to (i) add heuristically generated SVIs to an instance of [ADMIP2] to improve branchand-bound solution times, (ii) generalize SVIs to '' -SVIs'' that guarantee not to eliminate all -optimal solutions, and (iii) solve [ADLP1] and [ADLP2] in a decomposition algorithm whose master problem constraints consist solely of SVIs. The ''covering algorithm'' alluded to in (iii) uses no dual bounds r at all, and converts Benders decomposition into a purely combinatorial procedure.
Standard Computational Enhancements for Benders Decomposition
In addition to employing SVIs, Algorithm A-1 can benefit from more standard techniques used to improve solution speeds for Benders decomposition [46] . Some of these techniques are discussed briefly below. problem solutionsŷ may prove better than those derived from extreme-point solutions. For instance, an arc k with a large flowŷ k on it appears as an attractive candidate for interdiction in the solution of the maximum-flow interdiction problem. That is, it generates a cut with a large-magnitude entry in position k. Butŷ k may be large primarily because the solution is an extremepoint solution, not because it must be large to achieve a maximum s-t flow. So, A-1 may waste time exploring solutions with x k = 1. In contrast, an interiorpoint solution ''spreads flow around'' the network, andŷ k will tend to be large only if it needs to be in order to achieve a maximum s-t flow. Consequently, better guidance and better cuts may be derived from such solutions. 4. Some Benders cuts can be dominated (implied) by others, and the nondominated ones ought to be used for the sake of efficiency. Magnanti and Wong [46] provide guidance on this topic. The related work of Smith et al. [47] may also prove useful: that paper shows how a polynomial-sized reformulation of the master problem in an interdiction model can yield cuts that dominate an exponential number of cuts from the original formulation. 
Global Benders Decomposition
and where X is defined as in Equation (5), y ∈ Y can be discrete and/or continuous, and f (x, y) has a general form. Furthermore, suppose that penalty vectors v(x) can be defined so that
Then, the following master problem is equivalent to [AD3]:
Given the existence of an equivalent master problem, [AD3] may be solved via a modified version of A-1. We may assume that the attacker has an efficient method for computing z 3 (x), that is, for evaluating the effects of an attack planx through the solution of the defender's subproblem. For instance, to evaluate the effects of attack planx on an electricpower transmission grid, the attacker can solve a nonlinear ''AC optimal power-flow model'' or a standard, faster, LP approximation, a ''DC optimal power-flow model'' [64] . Thus, the difficult part here will be defining and computing appropriate penalty vectors v(x). That task will be problem-dependent, so we expand upon the power-grid example to illustrate.
An attacker wishes to maximize the short-term, unserved demand for power in a defender's transmission grid. Thus, [ADMP3] must be converted to a maximization problem, and the inequality in Equation (26) reversed. Whenx k = 0, v k (x) should bound the amount of unserved demand that will accrue if the status of grid component k is changed from ''unattacked and functional'' to ''attacked and nonfunctional.'' The powerhandling capability of the component provides a simple bound which is usually valid. If x k = 1, v k (x) must reflect how much unserved demand will be eliminated if component k's status is changed in the opposite direction. Because of the existence of series components, v k (x) = 0 is a reasonable, albeit crude, approximation. (Actually, unserved demand can increase after repairing a component, but this does not normally cause difficulties [45] ).
The subproblem in this example is merely a LP, and an attack on component k does force its capacity to 0 as in [ADLP1]. A complication arises, however, because the destruction of a component can also improve power flow by eliminating one or more ''susceptance constraints'' between power lines having common end points [64] . Thus, z 0 (x) is neither concave nor convex in this application. However, this function tends to be wellbehaved in practice, and the corresponding penalty vector v(x) is easily computed. The definition of that vector may seem simplistic, but Salmerón et al. [45] use it within global Benders decomposition to solve interdiction models on full-scale, regional transmission grids. An added benefit of the global Benders approach is that it extends to the trilevel network-defense problem for a power grid.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has described mathematical techniques for modeling and solving a BNI. BNI is a two-person, zero-sum, two-stage, sequential-play (Stackelberg) game whose solution prescribes an optimal application of limited resources to attack components of an enemy's network, and thereby limit that network's usefulness to the enemy. When a LP suffices to model optimal network operation, we show that BNI can be converted to and solved as a MIP. But, we describe special decomposition techniques that typically solve these problems more efficiently and, importantly, can solve more general problems.
